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In this paper, we make a comparison of industry output, inputs and productivity growth 
and levels between seven advanced economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, UK and U.S.). Our industry-level growth accounts make use of input data 
on labour quantity (hours) and composition (schooling levels), and distinguish between 
six different types of capital assets (including three ICT assets). The comparisons of 
levels rely on industry-specific purchasing power parities (PPPs) for output and inputs, 
within a consistent input-output framework for the year 1997. Our results show that 
differences in productivity growth and levels can mainly be traced to market services, not 
to goods-producing industries. Part of the strong productivity growth in market services 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Australia and Canada, may be related to relatively low 
productivity levels compared to the U.S. In contrast, services productivity levels in 
continental European countries were on par with the U.S. in 1997, but growth in Europe 
was much weaker since then. In terms of factor input use, the U.S. is very different from 
all other countries, mostly because of the more intensive use of ICT capital in the U.S. 
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During the second half of the 1990s the comparative growth performance of many OECD 
countries has undergone a marked change. For the first time since World War II labour 
productivity growth in most countries that have been part of the European Union (EU) for 
a decade or more (the EU-15) has fallen behind the U.S. for a considerable length of time. 
Whereas average annual labour productivity growth in the U.S. accelerated from 1.2 
percent during the period 1987-1995 to 2.3 percent during 1995-2005, EU-15 
productivity growth declined from 2.2 to 1.4 percent. The downward trend in the EU-15 
was rather continuous as growth slowed from 1.7 percent from 1995-2000 to 1.1 percent 
from 2000-2005. Just like the U.S., various other Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular 
Australia and Canada, experienced a significant improvement in productivity growth 
during the late 1990s (2.3 and 1.7 percent from 1995-2000 respectively), but since 2000 
productivity in these countries slowed down again to growth rates comparable to the pre-
1995 period (1.7 and 1.3 percent in 2000-2005 respectively). In contrast, U.S. 
productivity accelerated from 2.2 percent in 1995-2000 to 2.5 percent in 2000-2005.
1
 The striking acceleration in U.S. output and productivity growth since the mid 
1990s and in particular the role of information and communication technology (ICT) has 
been much discussed in the literature.
2 ICT had an impact on growth through a surge in 
ICT investment, strong productivity contributions from ICT-producing industries and a 
more productive use of ICT in the rest of the economy. Notably the market services 
sector of the U.S. economy seems to have strongly benefited from the increase in ICT use. 
Unfortunately, there is much less agreement on the reasons for the slower productivity 
growth in Europe. Compared to the U.S., ICT investment, ICT production and the 
productive use of ICT in Europe generated less productivity growth during the late 1990s 
(van Ark et al., 2003; Inklaar et al., 2005, Eicher and Roehn, 2006). But the reasons for 
the limited impact of new technology, innovation and structural reforms on economic 
growth in Europe are still poorly understood. The acceleration and subsequent 
deceleration in Australia and Canada has also puzzled various scholars (Parham, 2005; 
Rao et al., 2005). Cyclical slowdown might be one reason, but there may be other reasons 
                                                 
1 See TCB/GGDC (2006) 
2 See e.g. Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002); Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000); Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005); 
Gordon (2003, 2004); Stiroh (2002a); Triplett and Bosworth (2004); Botsch and Stiroh (2006); Basu and 
Fernald (2006) and Corrado, Lengermann, Bartelsman and Beaulieu (2006). 
  2related to short term shocks, the innovation system and a possible slowdown in reforms 
in the labour and product markets.   
This paper extends our previous studies in this research field by providing a 
combined analysis of productivity growth and levels by industry. The major novelty in 
this paper is the comparison of output, input and productivity levels in a comprehensive 
framework. Looking at growth and levels together enables one to better understand the 
differences in contributions of inputs (labour composition, ICT and non-ICT capital) to 
output performance. In this paper we focus our analysis on a comparison of seven 
advanced economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States). While our present growth and level accounting dataset 
provides detail on 26 industries (of which 25 in the market economy), we focus the 
discussion in this paper on the comparative performance of three major sectors which 
constitute the market economy: the ICT production sector, goods-producing industries 
and market services.  
We find that a distinction between the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, 
UK and U.S.) and the continental European countries (France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) is useful. In the Anglo-Saxon countries market services have been 
contributing more to labour productivity growth since 1995 than before. Only part of the 
increase in labour productivity growth can be traced to higher direct contributions from 
ICT investment. A large part of the acceleration of growth in this sector is also due to 
higher total factor productivity growth. Strikingly, the continental European countries 
have not experienced this acceleration in TFP growth. Evidence from other studies 
suggests that this may be related to a more productive use of ICT in Anglo-Saxon 
economies, although this can be neither confirmed nor rejected on the basis of the 
industry-level data presented here. 
Our comparison of productivity levels for 1997 suggests that TFP levels in goods 
production are relatively close between countries. In contrast, productivity levels in 
market services show relatively large gaps for Australia, Canada and the U.K. relative to 
the U.S., whereas the continental European countries are at or even above the U.S. TFP 
level in market services. This raises the possibility that the three Anglo-Saxon countries 
exhibit some kind of catching-up to the U.S. in particular in market services. But it also 
  3raises questions concerning the interpretation of the high productivity levels in 
continental Europe. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline our basic growth and level 
accounting methodology. In Section 3, the data and results of our growth accounts are 
presented at the level of three major sectors of the economy. Section 4 briefly introduces 
our level accounting methodology, followed by a discussion of the level estimates. In the 
concluding section we summarize our main results, and indicate the areas for future 
research. 
2. Growth and level accounting methodology 
The productivity analysis in this study is rooted in the tradition of national accounting, 
input-output analysis and growth accounting, as pioneered by – among others – Simon 
Kuznets, Wassily Leontief, Robert Solow, Edward Denison, Zvi Griliches and Dale 
Jorgenson. Using these techniques macroeconomic and industry and aggregate measures 
of output can be decomposed into the contributions of inputs and productivity.
3 In this 
section we outline the basic growth accounting methodology and discuss how this 
framework is augmented to account for productivity level differences across countries. 
To assess the contribution of the various inputs to aggregate growth, we apply the 
growth accounting framework as developed by Jorgenson and associates (see, for 
example, Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005). For each industry gross value added (VA) is 
computed according to a production function f using ICT capital services (
ICT K ), non-
ICT capital services (
N K ) and labour services (L). Productivity (A) is represented as a 
Hicks-neutral augmentation of aggregate inputs. The industry production function 






t t t K K L f A VA , , =  (1) 
Under the assumption of competitive factor markets, full input utilization and constant 
returns to scale, the growth of output can be expressed as the (compensation share) 
weighted growth of inputs and total factor productivity, denoted by A, which is derived as 
a residual:  
                                                 
3 See Schreyer (2001) for a more detailed exposition. 
4 In equations (1) to (5) we drop industry subscripts i for sake of convenience 
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i v denotes the two-period average share of input i  in nominal value added. 
Imposing constant returns to scale implies  1 = + +
ICT N L v v v . Capital services are 
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where 
K
j v   is the two-period average share of asset type j in total nominal capital 
compensation. For our growth accounts we use ICT capital services, which are calculated 
by weighting each of the ICT capital stocks by the share of the asset in total ICT capital 
compensation. Non-ICT capital services are calculated analogously.  
We define the change in labour composition as the difference between the growth 











































Here  Lt is the labour input index, aggregated over the h  labour types using labour 
compensation shares and   is total hours worked, summed over the different labour 
types. By rearranging equation (2) the results can be presented in terms of average labour 
productivity growth defined as the ratio of output to hours worked, 
t H
H VA va = , the ratio 
of capital services to hours worked,  H K k = , labour composition and TFP as follows: 
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We name the decomposition in equation (5) an “input decomposition”. As we also focus 
in this paper on the contribution of industries to aggregate labour productivity growth, an 
“industry decomposition” measures industry contributions to GDP as follows (Stiroh, 
2002a): 
                                                 
5 This is sometimes referred to as ‘labour quality growth’ such as in Jorgenson et al. (2005). However, the 
advantage of the term ‘labour composition change’ is that it does not imply that workers with lower wages 
have a lower quality. Instead, positive labour composition change only implies a shift towards workers with 
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ln ln ln ln ln  (6) 
where 
VA
i v is the two-period average share of industry i in aggregate value added. The 
term in brackets in equation (6) is the reallocation of hours. It reflects differences in the 
share of an industry in aggregate value added and its share in aggregate hours worked. 
This term will be positive when industries with an above-average labour productivity 
level show positive employment growth or when industries with below average labour 
productivity have declining employment shares.  
Obviously, one can go one step further by combining the input and industry 
decompositions of industry labour productivity. Labour productivity growth at an 
aggregate level is then decomposed into input contributions and a reallocation term for 
each industry: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + =
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In similar fashion, the contribution from industry TFP growth to aggregate TFP growth 




















Comparing productivity levels across countries is in many ways analogous to 
comparisons over time. Under the assumption of a common production function across 
countries, equations (2) to (8) can be used after replacing time subscripts t and t-1 by 
country subscripts. Our level accounts differ from the growth accounts in two respects. 
First, while one typically compares productivity in one year with productivity in the next 
or previous year, there is no such natural ordering of countries. Therefore the comparison 
should not depend on the country that is chosen as the base country. There are various 
index number methods that can be used to make multilateral comparisons. We use the 
method suggested by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982). This index mirrors the 
Törnqvist index approach used in our growth accounting, but all countries are compared 
  6to an artificial ‘average’ country (AC).
6 This average country is defined as the simple 
average of all M countries in the set. For example, a multilateral index of capital services 













, ln ln    (9) 
with  [] AC j c j j v v v , , 2
1
+ = c j v , ,    the share of asset type j in total nominal capital 
compensation in country c,  ∑ = c j AC j v N v , , 1 the average compensation share of capital 
asset  j over all countries N  and  ∑ = c j AC j K N K , , 1 , the average capital stock. This 
mirrors equation (3). A comparison between two countries, say Germany and the US, can 
be made indirectly: by first comparing each country with the average country and then 
comparing the differences in German and US levels relative to the average country. 
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with v ’s the input shares in value added averaged between country c and the average 
country  AC. Analogous to equation (8), the contribution of industry TFP gaps to 














, ln ln ∑ =  (11)   
Furthermore, while each country’s national accounts presents information about 
value added at constant prices over time, such data is not available for directly comparing 
industry value added across countries. As described in more detail below, our starting 
point is to measure relative prices (PPPs) for gross output at the industry level. In 
combination with Supply and Use tables, we use these relative gross output prices to 
implicitly calculate relative value added prices based on the following expression: 
                                                 
6 In practice this means applying an EKS procedure to the bilateral Törnqvist indices. The results below are 
expressed by using the U.S. as the benchmark country. It should be stressed that the decompositions of 
equations (5)-(8) are noticeably less accurate approximations to the underlying aggregator functions for 






















ln 1 ln ln − + =  (12) 
where  w   is the share of value added in gross output averaged between the 
country and the average country, and the superscripts GO, VA and II denote gross output, 
value added and intermediate inputs, respectively. The relative VA price levels are used 
to calculate implicit relative VA quantity indices which are the output measures we use 
below. 
3. Data and results for growth accounting 
Data 
For the growth accounts in this paper we developed a database on output and labour and 
capital inputs for seven countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, for 26 industries covering the 
period 1987 to 2003 (see Table A.1).
7 The data on value added and total hours worked 
are based on the most recent release of the GGDC (2006a) 60-Industry Database, while 
the full industry growth accounts are from the GGDC (2006b) Industry Growth 
Accounting Database.
8
Output is defined as value added at constant prices and is taken from national 
accounts complemented with measures from industrial and business surveys. Labour 
input is measured as hours worked defined as the total number of persons employed 
(including self-employed) times the average number of hours worked. For labour input in 
each country we distinguish between three and seven types of educational attainment. For 
our capital input measures we use data on investment in current and constant prices for 
six asset types. Three assets refer to ICT goods (computers, communication equipment 
and software) and three to non-ICT goods (transport equipment, other (non-ICT) 
machinery and equipment and non-residential structures).
9 To estimate capital stocks we 
                                                 
7 Together, the four European countries cover about 70 percent of output in the EU-15. See O’Mahony and 
van Ark (2003) and van Ark and Inklaar (2005) for figures at the aggregate level for all EU-15 countries. 
The Australian data covers fiscal years running from July to June. Following OECD convention, we 
allocate data for July 2000 to June 2001 to the year 2000. 
8 All data and more detailed source descriptions are downloadable at www.ggdc.net/dseries. 
9 Residential buildings are not taken into account to allow for a sharper focus on the productivity 
contribution of business-related assets. Since most of the outputs and inputs of the real estate industry 
consists of housing and imputed rents from housing we would have to make an adjustment for this. 
  8use industry-specific geometric depreciation rates for detailed assets in the U.S., provided 
in Fraumeni (1997), in combination with industry shares of these assets from the BEA 
NIPA. The deflators for ICT producing manufacturing industries and ICT investment 
have been harmonised across countries as discussed by Inklaar et al. (2005), except in the 
case of Canada and Australia which already use constant-quality price indices to a similar 
extent as the U.S. 
The series for the European countries were published earlier by Inklaar et al. 
(2005), but were revised and updated to 2003 using the same sources and methods as 
before. For the United States, we have developed an entirely new dataset, which is 
largely based on the latest releases by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of GDP- 
by-Industry data that cover the period 1947-2004. These data are organized according to 
the NAICS 1997 classification system and are consistent with the 2003 Comprehensive 
Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). In addition to the GDP 
by Industry data, we use numerous other sources, most notably industry output and 
employment data from the BLS, to obtain a complete set of growth accounts. For U.S. 
investment we used two main sources from the BEA, namely the 1997 Capital Flow 
Table and the BEA Detailed Data for Fixed Assets with time series for the period 1901-
2004. We made substantial adjustments to the U.S. data to fit the ISIC rev. 3 industrial 
classification, which is the basis of our internationally comparative database.
10
Data for Canada and Australia were developed specifically for the purpose of this 
paper. In the case of Canada the new NAICS-based use tables for the period 1961-2001 
have been used to construct the output series. These data were extrapolated to 2003 using 
industry output series.
11 Employment data were drawn mostly from the OECD STAN 
database (2004 release). Detailed tables on investment by industry and asset tables from 
Statistics Canada were obtained through Industry Canada. For manufacturing industries, 
we supplemented those tables with information from the final demand part of the input-
output tables. Ho, Rao and Tang (2004, Tables 10-12) provide data on labour 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, it is hard to separate imputed rents from the other output in the real estate sector. Hence we 
decided to leave the entire real estate industry out of our dataset. 
10 For the U.S., no educational attainment data has been collected for years after 2000, so labour 
composition change is assumed to be zero for the latest three years. 
11 Industry output series for 2002 and 2003 are at constant prices. Current price data are estimated using 
producer price indices for most goods-producing industries and the GDP deflator for other industries. The 
2002 input-output tables were released by Statistics Canada after we completed the dataset for this paper. 
  9composition change for Canada, which were compiled in a broadly comparable fashion to 
our methodology for the other countries.  
Output series for Australia are mainly taken from the national accounts, 
supplemented by industry surveys. Data on employment are taken from the Australia’s 
labour force statistics. Detailed investment by industry and asset tables are part of the 
Australian national accounts, and were supplemented with data from manufacturing 
surveys to distinguish investment by detailed manufacturing industries. Investment in 
communication equipment was split off from the broader category (electrical and 
electronic equipment) using input-output tables. For Australia we only had access to 
information from the national accounts on labour composition change for the aggregate 
market sector from the national accounts. This rate was applied to each of the individual 
industries. 
Industry decomposition of labour productivity growth 
On the basis of the dataset described above, measures of labour productivity growth and 
the contribution of individual industries and major industry groups to aggregate 
productivity growth can be calculated. Table 1 shows the results of the industry 
decomposition from equation (6) for the market sector of the economy for the 1987-1995 
and 1995-2003 periods.
12 The table shows a large acceleration in productivity growth in 
Australia, Canada and the U.S. for the market sector as a whole since 1995. Labour 
productivity growth in France and Germany slowed down substantially, while growth in 
the Netherlands stagnated. In the UK, growth also slowed down somewhat, but it 
remained high compared to the continental European countries. 
For the industry decomposition we present the results for three major industry 
groups.
13 Firstly, the contribution of ICT production sector, which includes both ICT 
                                                 
12 The exact definition of the market economy (or business sector) differs by country and organization. We 
classify government (ISIC 75), education (ISIC 80) and health (ISIC 85) as non-market services, even 
though some or even most of education and health may be operated or owned by non-governmental 
organizations. The reason for excluding these sectors from the analysis is mainly due to severe 
measurement problems in these industries. Moreover the international comparability of non-market output 
measures is very weak, which makes affects the interpretation of differences in growth performance at the 
total economy level. Table 1 also shows the total economy aggregates, including non-market services and 
these results were more extensively analyzed in Timmer and van Ark (2005). 
13 Reallocation effects are generally negative, which suggests that industries with an above-average labour 
productivity level exhibit declining employment shares. In earlier work, such as van Ark et al. (2003), we 
also distinguished between industries that used ICT intensive and those that did not – based on U.S. 
  10manufacturing and services (communications, software, etc.), differs between countries. 
The U.S. and the UK show rather high contributions from ICT-producers to productivity 
growth, whereas the continental European countries take an intermediate position and 
Australia and Canada show very small contributions. Secondly, the differences in average 
contributions of ‘other’ goods-producing industries (excluding ICT producing 
manufacturing) have been very small since 1995. Of course, there are differences 
between contributions of individual goods-producing industries, but mostly these 
contributions are positive and small and therefore matter relatively little for the aggregate 
performance. 
Finally, and most importantly, the differences in contributions of market services 
(excluding ICT services) are quite large between the countries. All Anglo-Saxon 
countries show accelerations in the contributions from market services to labour 
productivity growth since 1995, ranging from 0.5 percentage point acceleration in the UK 
to 1.5 percentage points in Australia. In the U.S., labour productivity in market services 
increased by 0.9 percentage point from 0.9 per cent per year in 1987-1995 to 1.8 per cent 
per year from 1995-2003. In the Netherlands market services showed a slight increase in 
the contribution of 0.2 percentage point, but France and Germany experienced a 
deceleration of 0.1 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. 
Input decomposition for market services 
Using data on capital services and labour composition, labour productivity growth rates 
for each industry and industry group are decomposed into contributions from ICT capital 
deepening, non-ICT capital deepening, labour composition change, TFP growth and 
reallocation of hours worked (see equation 7). Here we focus exclusively on an input 
decomposition of labour productivity growth in market services which are the most 
intensive users of ICT assets. The results are given in Table 2. All countries in the table 
show a moderate to substantial acceleration in the contribution of ICT capital deepening 
in market services. However, what stands out in Table 2 is the rapid acceleration in TFP 
growth in market services in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, United 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimates of ICT investment relative to total investment. This approach necessitates a somewhat arbitrary 
distinction that has been criticized by, for example, Daveri (2004). More importantly though is the fact that 
it has become less important to make this distinction because we now have actual measures of ICT use for 
countries outside the U.S. 
  11Kingdom and United States).  Before 1995, TFP growth in market services was negative 
in these countries, but turned positive after 1995. In contrast, all continental European 
countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands) showed deteriorating TFP growth in 
market services after 1995. Germany and the Netherlands experienced negative TFP 
growth in market services after 1995 and France shows only a small positive growth rate.  
Table 3, based on equation (8), looks at the contribution of individual service 
industries to total factor productivity growth in market services from 1995-2003, with a 
breakdown for 1995-2000 and 2000-2003. The table shows a strong contribution from 
wholesale trade in the Netherlands and the U.S., even though it slowed down since 2000, 
in particular in the Netherlands. Retail trade showed a particularly strong performance in 
Australia and Canada from 1995-2000, but the retail sector’s contribution to overall 
market services TFP growth slowed down almost everywhere since 2000. Financial 
intermediation was particularly strong in the United States since 2000, but not in other 
countries. A distinctive difference since 2000, however, is the strong improvement of 
productivity growth in business services in all four Anglo-Saxon economies. The 
category of “other market services” only showed a sizeable effect for Australia after 2000, 
which is primarily due to a productivity boom in construction. 
The precise reasons for the differences in productivity dynamics of market 
services are difficult to generalize. One possibility is that in some countries investments 
in ICT do not lead to faster TFP growth whereas in other countries they do. There may be 
many reasons for this, among which cyclical effects and the effects of unmeasured 
intangible investments stand out. Estimates of ICT output elasticities that are larger than 
the marginal cost of ICT capital services would violate a basic growth accounting 
assumption. However, Inklaar (2005) and van Ark and Inklaar (2005), in line with, for 
example, Stiroh (2002b), find that industry data do not exhibit supra-normal returns. 
There is even some evidence that it takes a number of years of below-normal returns 
before the productive returns of ICT become high enough to outweigh the cost.
14  
                                                 
14 An alternative approach is to directly estimate each of the output elasticities separately. For example, 
O’Mahony and Vecchi (2005) find super-normal returns on ICT, which they attribute (at least in part) to 
the returns to unmeasured intangible investment, such as organizational change or training programs. An 
advantage of their approach is that no assumptions about the other output elasticities have to be made, but 
the disadvantage is that it requires a rather restrictive functional form for the production function (such as 
Cobb-Douglas) for the estimation (see van Ark and Inklaar, 2005). 
  12The slow uptake of productivity in market services also emerges from studies that 
take a more industry-specific orientation. For example, McGuckin, Spiegelman and van 
Ark (2005) analyze labour productivity growth in European and U.S. wholesale and retail 
trade in detail. They find that technology adoption in Europe lags the U.S. by several 
years, which has been holding back European productivity growth. They also find that 
this lag can be (partly) attributed to stricter regulations in European countries.
15 But the 
explanation for the slowdown since 2000 has so far remained unexplained, and more 
work in this area (for retail and other service industries) is therefore required. 
To shed more light on the reasons for the large differences in the contribution of 
market services to productivity growth one might focus not exclusively on comparisons 
of growth rates but also on comparative levels of productivity. For example, rapid TFP 
growth could point towards catching-up and imitation when starting from a relatively low 
productivity level. Similarly, stagnating TFP growth at a relatively high level of TFP 
might be indicative of a lack of innovation. Therefore we turn to level comparisons for 
the remainder of this paper.  
4. Data and results for level accounting 
A level accounting approach to output and productivity comparisons has not been widely 
applied, which is primarily due to the lack of adequate industry-specific PPPs for output 
and inputs. PPPs are needed to adjust output and inputs for differences in relative price 
levels between countries. Since there is little reason to assume that these price differences 
are negligible between countries or the same across industries, such PPPs have to be 
industry-specific.  
Only few studies have attempted to measure industry-specific PPPs. Most 
comparisons have tended to restrict themselves to the total economy (e.g. Schreyer, 2006). 
Jorgenson, Kuroda and Nishimizu (1987) make use of specific PPPs for expenditure 
categories from OECD to measure TFP for about 30 industries between Japan and the 
U.S. These expenditure PPPs are adjusted for differences in transport and distribution 
margins across countries. Other studies have aimed to directly measure producer-price 
based PPPs. Van Ark and Pilat (1993) provided TFP level measures for manufacturing 
                                                 
15 For a more detailed statistical analysis of growth differences in the trade sector, see Timmer and Inklaar 
(2005).  
  13industries in Germany, Japan and the United States using a ratio of unit values which are 
based on producer quantities and values from production censuses in different countries. 
Similarly, Timmer (2000) measured TFP for manufacturing in Asian countries using a 
similar methodology. Pilat (1996), Mulder (1999), O’Mahony (1999), and O’Mahony and 
de Boer (2002) extended the industry-specific PPP approach to measuring output and 
productivity levels beyond manufacturing. Most studies had to rely on bilateral 
comparisons of pairs of countries. It has also turned out to be difficult to develop a 
consistent PPP methodology across the various studies because of differences in data 
availability. In particular, value added is often deflated by gross output price relatives, 
without taking into account differences in prices of intermediate inputs (so-called single 
versus double deflation). 
In this paper we make use of a new and comprehensive dataset of industry PPPs 
for 1997, in combination with a benchmark set of Supply and Use tables from the 
relevant statistical offices. PPPs for value added are constructed by double deflation of 
gross output and intermediate inputs within a consistent input-output framework (see 
equation (12)). In addition, relative price ratios for labour and capital input are developed. 
For a full discussion of the new industry PPPs, the reader is referred to Timmer, Ypma 
and van Ark (2006). For the integration of gross output PPPs and the derivation of input 
PPPs in a level accounting framework, details are spelled out in Inklaar and Timmer 
(2006). Below we only present the most important elements of our methodology. 
PPPs for gross output are defined from the producer’s point of view and are at 
basic prices, which measures the amount received by the producer for a unit of a good or 
service produced. These PPPs have partly been constructed by way of unit value ratios 
for agricultural, mining, manufacturing and transport and communication services. For 
other industries, PPPs are based on specific expenditure prices from Eurostat and the 
OECD, which are allocated to individual industries producing the specific item. The 
value was adjusted from expenditure to producer level with relative transport and 
distribution margins and by adjusting for differences in relative tax rates. Margins and tax 
rates were derived from benchmark supply and use tables for 1997. This set of gross 
output PPPs for 1997, covering 45 industries at (roughly) 2-digit industry level, has been 
made transitive across countries by applying the multilateral EKS-procedure for a total of 
26 countries, which are all OECD countries but also includes Taiwan). For this study the 
  14gross output PPPs were then are allocated to the 26 industries in Input-Output tables for 
1997.  
Intermediate input PPPs are required in order to double deflate value added. 
These input PPPs should reflect the costs of acquiring intermediate deliveries, hence they 
need to be based on purchasers’ prices. Assuming that the basic price of a good is 
independent of its use, we can use the same gross output PPP for a particular industry, 
after adjustment for margins and net taxes, to deflate all intermediate deliveries from that 
industry to other industries. The aggregate intermediate input PPP for an industry is then 
derived by weighting its intermediate inputs at the gross output PPPs from the delivering 
industries. Imports are separately identified for which exchange rates are used as PPP, 
hence assuming no price differences across countries for imported commodities. 
To obtain PPPs for capital and labour input, we follow the methodology outlined 
by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978). The PPP for capital services is based on the 
expenditure PPP for investment from Eurostat and the OECD, adjusted for differences in 
the user costs between countries. The user cost of capital input depends on the rate of 
return to capital, the depreciation rate and the investment price change. This data is taken 
from the growth accounts discussed in the previous section.  The procedure to obtain a 
PPP for labour is more straightforward than for capital as it simply involves aggregating 
relative wages across different labour types using labour compensation for each type as 
weights. For this purpose we only distinguish between two labour categories: workers 
with a university degree or higher, and those without. This limited number of skill types 
is due to difficulties in matching schooling systems across the various countries.   
Industry decomposition of labour productivity levels 
The first step in presenting our level results, it to focus on the comparative levels of 
labour productivity for the same major industry groups (ICT production, other goods 
production and market services) as in the first part of the paper. Table 4 shows 
comparative levels of labour productivity, measured as value added per hour worked. The 
results for 1997 are for our benchmark year, and developed according to the methodology 
outlined above. 
Table 4 shows that the U.S. shows a labour productivity level in the market 
economy which is similar to that of the three continental European countries, ranging 
  15from France at 96 per cent of the U.S. level to the Netherlands at 107 per cent.
16 The 
other Anglo-Saxon countries show between 15 and 20 percent lower levels than the U.S, 
ranging from Australia at 73 per cent of the U.S. level to Canada at 88 per cent.  
Table 4 also shows relative labour productivity levels in ICT production, other 
goods-producing industries and other market services in 1997. The relative productivity 
levels in market services correspond most closely to those at the level of the market 
economy, with productivity levels in France, Germany and the Netherlands relatively 
close to that of the United States, while Australia, Canada and the UK are at a large 
distance from the other countries. Productivity levels in goods-producing industries are 
generally closer together, with the exception of Canada which has high productivity 
levels in some resource-intensive and heavy manufacturing industries, like oil refining, 
metal products and machinery. The high productivity levels in ICT production in France, 
Germany and the UK can mostly be traced to communications services, with again 
smaller differences in ICT manufacturing. 
Table 4 also shows an extrapolation of the benchmark results for labour 
productivity in 1997 to 2003. Starting from the relative labour productivity levels for 
1997, we have applied the relative growth between 1997 and 2003 at the aggregate and 
industry group level (see Table 1).
17 The faster productivity growth in the U.S. since 
1997 has resulted in lower productivity levels relative to the U.S. for the other countries, 
but the cumulative impact is still relatively small over a period of only six years.  
Input decomposition of level accounts for market services 
The relatively low productivity levels in market services in the Anglo-Saxon economies 
(except the U.S.) sheds additional light on the possible reasons for rapid productivity 
                                                 
16 The margin of error around level estimates is non-negligible. Although (formal) research on this issue is 
limited, Schreyer (2006) arrives at a confidence interval of (at least) 10 percent using a simulation exercise. 
Strikingly, the relative total economy levels are all higher relative to the U.S. than the market economy 
levels, signalling high relative TFP levels in non-market services in countries outside the U.S. These 
differences are largest in European countries, like France and the Netherlands. As before, when dealing 
with the growth, it is not clear how to interpret the results for the non-market sector given the substantial 
measurement problems that remain. 
17 The data requirements for a level comparison for one year are quite substantial, and in many cases these 
data only become available with a considerable lag. As a result, a fully consistent level accounting exercise 
cannot yet be done for a later year than our benchmark year 1997. Extrapolating the 1997 benchmark 
results forward is also not straightforward since ideally this should be done at most detailed level before re-
aggregating using the CCD-method. As the data requirements for such an extrapolation would be 
comparable to that of a new benchmark, this is also not feasible at the moment. 
  16growth in the market services sector for these countries, as was observed earlier. Rapid 
growth might typically be related to catching up-effects as the industries started from low 
levels of productivity, and benefited from technological progress, innovation and 
institutional changes – more than the continental European countries which started from 
much higher levels. To explore this possibility further, an input decomposition of 
differences in the level of productivity is useful. 
Table 5 shows an input decomposition of the labour productivity gap in market 
services into the contributions of ICT capital intensity, non-ICT capital intensity, labour 
composition and TFP to the gap following equation (10). For example, the (log) labour 
productivity gap between Australia and the U.S. is 39 percentage points,
18 of which nine 
percentage points are due to lower ICT intensity, four percentage points to lower non-ICT 
intensity and lower labour composition, and 21 percentage points due to lower TFP levels. 
A number of observations stand out from Table 5.  Firstly, ICT capital input per 
hour worked is higher in U.S. market services than anywhere else, and accounts for 
between 3 and 10 percentage points of the U.S. labour productivity level advantage. In 
contrast, non-ICT capital levels are higher in the continental European countries, and 
account for the bulk of the productivity advantage in market services for France and 
Germany. In Germany, higher capital intensity adds as much as 21 percentage points to 
Germany’s advantage relative to the U.S., accounting for more than the total labour 
productivity gap.
19 This is partly compensated by lower ICT capital intensity and less 
skilled labour. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, non-ICT capital intensity in market services 
is lower than in the U.S. Labour composition levels in market services are also below the 
U.S. levels, with the exception of Canada and the Netherlands where it is relatively close 
to the U.S. level. 
The major factor accounting for the productivity gap between the U.S. and the 
other Anglo-Saxon countries is the lower TFP level in market services in the latter 
countries. It accounts for between 21 percentage points of the Australian gap relative to 
the U.S. and 26 percentage points of the Canadian gap. In France and Germany, the TFP 
                                                 
18 The gap here is defined as the difference in the natural log of the levels, to stay consistent with the 
growth accounts and the decomposition formulae which are also in terms of logs. 
19 The quality of data on investment by industry and asset as well as the investment PPPs are areas for 
potential improvement of the results. However, any adjustment would have to be implausibly large to 
account for the high non-ICT capital intensity level in Germany. 
  17level is comparable to the U.S. Only in the Netherlands, the higher productivity level in 
market services relative to the United States is largely due to a higher TFP level.  
Finally, Table 6 provides an industry decomposition of the TFP gaps in market 
services relative to the United States. In contrast to the input decomposition of market 
services in table 5, productivity gaps are now decomposed to the contribution of 
productivity gaps in the more detailed industries, see equation (11). So, for example, the 
21 percentage point TFP gap in market services between Australia and the U.S. is mainly 
due to the gap in business services, contributing almost 15 percentage points, followed by 
“other” market services at 7 percentage points. In finance, the TFP level in Australia is 
higher than in the U.S., so its contribution to the overall gap is positive. 
There is clear evidence that the productivity level advantage of the continental 
European countries is primarily located in wholesale trade and – to a lesser extent – in 
retail trade. The Netherlands also shows a productivity level advantage in transport and 
storage and financial intermediation. Financial intermediation shows positive 
contributions from high productivity levels in Australia, France and Germany. Strikingly, 
business services contribute negatively to the productivity gap relative to the U.S. for all 
countries. 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper we combined a growth and level accounting approach to compare 
productivity at industry level among seven advanced economies (Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States). Our analysis 
uses an industry decomposition for 26 industries, of which 25 are part of the market 
economy, and an input decomposition of labour productivity into the contributions from 
ICT capital intensity, non-ICT capital intensity, labour composition and total factor 
productivity. By looking at both growth and levels together, which is the major novelty of 
this paper, we may get a better view of the extent to which fast (or slow) growth rates 
may be due to catching-up effects. 
Our analysis shows that market services play a key role in explaining the stronger 
productivity growth of the Anglo-Saxon economies (Australia, Canada, the UK and the 
U.S.). We also find that the continental European countries (France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) experienced a strong slowdown in market services. Our input 
  18decomposition shows that the differential growth performance is mostly strongly related 
to differences in TFP growth, whereas ICT capital deepening accelerated everywhere 
since 1995 – also in the countries with slow productivity growth.
20  An industry 
decomposition of market services attributes a large role to slower productivity growth in 
business services in Europe. 
The level analysis in the second part of the paper reveals that total factor 
productivity gaps at the aggregate level mainly emerge for Anglo-Saxon economies 
(other than the U.S.) which can also be largely traced to market services. For the Anglo-
Saxon economies lower TFP levels in market services are the key explanation for lower 
aggregate labour productivity levels. An industry decomposition again points in the 
direction of the importance of business services accounting for a large part of the 
productivity shortfall relative to the U.S. TFP levels in continental European countries are 
at or even substantially above the U.S. productivity level in market services. The 
advantage for France and Germany is in part related to higher levels of non-ICT capital 
intensity, but in the Netherlands higher TFP levels also play a role.  
The combination of low productivity levels and high productivity growth in 
market services in the Anglo-Saxon economies (Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom), suggests a role for catching up on the U.S. productivity level. This catching 
up may be related to a rapid adoption of ICT, which is an input of major importance in 
market services, and TFP growth. Even though a direct relationship between ICT capital 
deepening and TFP growth cannot be derived from the industry data as used in this study 
(Inklaar, 2005; van Ark and Inklaar, 2005), other studies using firm level data or specific 
case studies show that the productive impact of ICT depends crucially on investments in 
intangible capital such as organizational change and employee training programs. But 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), for example, argue that it takes a substantial amount of 
time for these complementary intangible investments to have their full effect on 
productivity. Reforms in product and labour markets may also be needed to exploit the 
productivity potential of ICT (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). 
The combination of high productivity levels and slow productivity growth in 
market services in continental European countries may be due to an element of 
                                                 
20 A further decomposition of growth between 1995 and 2003 into the pre and post-2000 period, shows that 
the absolute contribution of ICT capital deepening after 2000 returned to pre-1995 levels in most countries. 
  19“perversity” in the productivity performance of many European service industries. This 
perversity may be related to underutilization of the consumer market potential. For 
example, if all the shopping needs to be done between 9 am and 6 pm instead of having 
access to retail facilities 24 hours per day, productivity may turn out higher in the former 
case. As a result of rigid markets a higher utilization of labour and capital (shop floor) 
capacity is realized. These observations raise new questions concerning an old debate on 
the need to adjust productivity measures for users’ convenience, and the adjustment of 
inputs for utilisation rates, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
Finally, we stress that at this stage, caution is needed when drawing far-reaching 
conclusions from the integrated productivity growth and level comparisons as this type 
integrated measurement is still in its infancy. Some of the hypotheses about industry 
group and aggregate productivity differences are not necessarily borne out by the detailed 
industry results. Measurement and conceptualization within a national accounts 
framework still offers much scope for improvement. Some of the detailed industry results 
suggest there is room to improve the comparability and quality of the underlying data. 
The dataset for this paper provides a bridge between our earlier datasets on industry and 
growth accounts and a more comprehensive growth and level accounts framework in the 
EU KLEMS project which will be published in 2007. The results from the latter project 
need to be awaited to find confirmation at the level of individual industries and for 
additional countries of the broad trends sketched here. 
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lands Kingdom States
1987-1995
Market economy 1.1 1.2 2.7 2.8 1.7 2.9 1.9
contributions from:
ICT production 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.6
Goods-producing industries 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8 0.5
Market services 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.9
Reallocation of hours -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2
Total economy 1.3 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.6 3.0 1.3
1995-2003
Market economy 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.7 3.0
contributions from:
ICT production 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.8
Goods-producing industries 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.7
Market services 1.8 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.5 1.8
Reallocation of hours -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
Total economy 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 2.5 2.5
Australia
Source: GGDC Industry Growth Accounting Database, see www.ggdc.net for data. See Section 2 and Inklaar et al. (2005) for methods, 
and Section 3 and Appendix B for sources
Notes: Market economy includes all industries except real estate (ISIC70) government (ISIC75), education (ISIC80) and health 
(ISIC85). Labour productivity and TFP contributions are calculated using the share of industry value added in market economy value 
added. ICT/non-ICT capital contributions are calculated using the share of industry ICT/non-ICT capital compensation in aggregate 
value added. Labour quality contributions are calculated analogously based on industry labour compensation. Reallocation of hours is 
the difference between output-weighted industry growth in total hours worked and employment-weighted growth in total hours 
worked. ICT production includes electrical and optical equipment (ISIC30-33) and telecommunications (ISIC64). Goods-producing 
industries include all industries between ISIC01-41, except ICT production, market services includes all industries between ISIC45-74, 
except ICT production.
Table 1: Industry Contributions to Market Economy Labour Productivity Growth, 1987-2003 (value added per 
hour worked, percentage growth and contributions)
 
  25Canada France Germany Nether- United United
lands Kingdom States
1987-1995
Market services (excl. ICT services) 0.0 0.5 1.2 1.9 0.8 1.7 1.5
contributions from:
ICT capital deepening 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.9
Non-ICT capital deepening -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.3
Labour quality growth 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3
TFP growth -0.6 -0.7 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.2
Reallocation of hours 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
1995-2003
Market services (excl. ICT services) 2.8 2.4 0.9 0.9 1.1 2.2 2.7
contributions from:
ICT capital deepening 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.3
Non-ICT capital deepening 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4
Labour quality growth 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
TFP growth 1.7 1.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.5 0.9
Reallocation of hours -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Sources and notes: see Table 1
Table 2: Input Contributions to Market Services Labour Productivity Growth, 1995-2003 (value added per hour 
worked, percentage growth and contributions)
Australia
 
  26Canada France Germany Nether- United United
lands Kingdom States
1995-2000
Market services (excl. ICT services) 0.8 1.3 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.6
contributions from:
Wholesale trade 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.9
Retail trade 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.3
Transport & storage -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Financial intermediation 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.0
Business services -0.1 0.4 -0.4 -1.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4
Other market services(a) 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2
2000-2003
Market services (excl. ICT services) 3.2 1.7 -0.1 -0.7 -1.4 1.4 1.3
contributions from:
Wholesale trade 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.3
Retail trade 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.2
Transport & storage 0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2
Financial intermediation 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.4
Business services 0.9 0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 0.6 0.3
Other market services(a) 1.2 0.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.1
(a) Other market services include construction, hotels and restaurants and social & personal services.
Sources and notes: See Table 1
Australia
Table 3: Industry Contributions to Total Factor Productivity Growth in Market Services, 1995-2003, (percentage 
growth and contributions)
 
  27Canada France Germany Nether- United United
lands Kingdom States
1997
Market economy 73 88 96 103 107 73 100
ICT production 65 89 100 98 73 117 100
Goods-producing industries 82 127 92 89 102 80 100
Market services 68 65 96 113 118 64 100
Total economy 83 98 107 112 122 84 100
2003
Market economy 71 83 89 92 99 72 100
ICT production 42 59 98 84 68 124 100
Goods-producing industries 78 123 92 85 102 81 100
Market services 69 65 89 102 108 63 100
Total economy 82 95 103 105 115 84 100
Notes: For methodology, see Inklaar and Timmer (2006)
Table 4: Labour Productivity Levels Relative to United States, 1987 and 2003 (value added per hour worked, 
US=100)
Australia
Source: 1997: Supply and Use tables for individual countries from Inklaar and Timmer (2006) and PPPs from Timmer, Ypma and van 
Ark (2006); 2003 updated from 1997 with time series underlying table 1.
 
  28Canada France Germany Nether- United
lands Kingdom
Market services (excl. ICT services) -38.7 -43.2 -3.6 12.3 16.2 -44.1
contributions from:
ICT capital per hour worked -9.3 -9.1 -7.4 -3.2 -4.9 -10.1
Non-ICT capital per hour worked -3.9 -6.8 8.4 21.2 4.0 -7.2
Labour composition  -4.1 -1.6 -6.3 -8.0 -0.6 -4.2
TFP  -21.3 -25.6 1.6 2.3 17.8 -22.5
Sources and notes: see Table 4. The gap is defined as the natural log of the level. The contributions of the different inputs are 
calculated by multiplying the gap in input level by the share of each input in value added.
Table 5: Input Contributions to the Gap in Labour Productivity in Market Services, 1997 (value added per 
hour worked, gap measured as percentage productivity differential relative to the US)
Australia
 
Canada France Germany Nether- United
lands Kingdom
Total Factor Productivity
Market services (excl. ICT services) -21.3 -25.6 1.6 2.3 17.8 -22.5
contributions from:
Wholesale trade -5.0 -1.8 5.1 6.6 7.8 0.6
Retail trade -2.1 -2.0 3.0 2.9 2.3 -1.5
Transport & storage -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 -1.7 4.4 -2.2
Financial intermediation 7.4 -1.9 4.6 1.8 6.6 3.4
Business services -14.5 -12.7 -12.6 -8.8 -9.7 -11.1
Other market services(a) -6.7 -6.4 1.9 1.4 6.3 -11.8
(a) Other market services include construction, hotels and restaurants and social & personal services.
Australia
Sources and notes: see Table 4. The gap is defined as the natural log of the level. The contributions of the different 
industries are calculated by multiplying the gap in productivity levels by the share of each industry in value added. Due to 
index number problems, the contributions have to be normalized by distributing the difference between the sum of the 
contributions and the aggregate according to each industry's share in value added.
Table 6: Industry Contributions to the Gap in Total Factor Productivity in Market Services, 1997 (gap 
measured as percentage productivity differential relative to the US)
  29Table A.1, Industry list 
 
Industry ISIC rev3 code
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 01-05
Mining and quarrying 10-14
Food products 15-16
Textiles, clothing and leather 17-19
Wood products 20
Paper, printing and publishing 21-22
Petroleum and coal products 23
Chemical products 24
Rubber and plastics 25
Non-metalic mineral products 26
Metal products 27-28
Machinery 29
Electrical and optical equipment 30-33
Transport equipment 34-35
Furniture and miscellaneous manufacturing 36-37




Hotels and restaurants 55




Social and personal services 90-99
Non-market services 75-85  
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